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The Future
of InternetRelated Personal
Jurisdiction After
Goodyear Dunlap
Tires v. Brown and
J. McIntyre v. Nicastro
Megan M. La Belle
ince the World Wide Web was introduced in the
early 1990s, it has infiltrated so many aspects of our
personal and professional lives. We use the Internet
to communicate, conduct business, shop, socialize,
entertain ourselves, and gather information. In many
ways, the Internet has made our lives easier and better.
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Yet by facilitating and increasing contact with the rest of
the world, the Internet potentially expands the doctrine
of personal jurisdiction and exposes individuals and corporations to suit in distant and inconvenient locations.
For the past two decades, courts have struggled
with the question of how Internet-related contacts
should be treated in the personal jurisdiction analysis. Some courts have utilized the traditional minimum contacts framework of International Shoe v.
Washington,1 while others have devised new tests
to accommodate this technological evolution.2 So
when the US Supreme Court granted certiorari in
two personal jurisdiction cases last term—Goodyear
Dunlap Tires v. Brown3 and J. McIntyre v. Nicastro4—
many believed these unsettled questions of Internetrelated personal jurisdiction would finally be resolved.
Disappointingly for litigants, lower courts, and academics, however, Goodyear and McIntyre give little
guidance about the future of personal jurisdiction in
our virtual world.
PERSONAL JURISDICTION BEFORE
G O O DY E A R A N D M C I N T Y R E
Before last term, it had been nearly a quarter of a
century since the Supreme Court considered the doctrine of personal jurisdiction. To better understand
the issues decided by the Court, our starting point
is the state of personal jurisdiction jurisprudence
before Goodyear and McIntyre. The test for personal
jurisdiction involves a two-step inquiry: (1) Does
the forum state’s long-arm statute authorize personal
jurisdiction? and (2) Would the exercise of jurisdiction comport with due process?5 Since most state
long-arm statutes are co-extensive with the limits of
due process, the two inquiries frequently collapse into
one, and so the question is whether the assertion of
personal jurisdiction would violate the Due Process
Clause.6
The touchstone of due process for personal
jurisdiction over absent defendants is whether they
have meaningful “contacts, ties, or relations” with
the forum state and thus could reasonably anticipate
being haled into court there.7 In other words, a court
cannot force a party to defend a lawsuit in a state
unless the defendant has the requisite “minimum contacts” with that state, and the exercise of jurisdiction
would not offend “traditional notions of fair play and
substantial justice.”8
3
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Two profiles of personal jurisdiction have evolved
since International Shoe: general jurisdiction and specific jurisdiction. In order to be subject to a court’s
general jurisdiction, the defendant must have “continuous and systematic” contacts with the forum
state.9 Assuming such contacts exist, courts may
exercise jurisdiction over the defendant with respect
to any type of lawsuit, even if the action is not related
to the defendant’s contacts with the forum state.
Specific jurisdiction, on the other hand, requires
less pervasive contacts between the defendant and the
forum state. Under this doctrine, however, courts are
only permitted to exercise jurisdiction over a defendant if the lawsuit arises out of—or is related to—
the defendant’s contacts with the forum. Moreover,
the defendant’s contacts with the forum state must
be purposeful, and the assertion of jurisdiction must
be reasonable and fair.10 In this situation, the “‘relationship among the defendant, the forum, and the
litigation,’ is the essential foundation of in personam
jurisdiction.”11
These jurisdictional constructs provide standards
for courts and litigants regarding the personal jurisdiction analysis. Yet, because the question of whether
a non-resident defendant is subject to personal jurisdiction in a forum state is heavily fact-dependent, the
outcome of jurisdictional disputes is always difficult to
predict; and when the defendant’s only contacts with
the forum state are indirect, the personal jurisdiction
analysis becomes even more complicated.
THE STREAM OF COMMERCE AND
PERSONAL JURISDICTION
In the decades following International Shoe,
the economy continued to grow and the flow of
commerce between the states steadily increased.
Consequently, corporations transacted significant
business that crossed stated lines—they maintained
stores and manufacturing facilities, sold goods and
services, advertised, and employed people in other
states. With this fundamental transformation of
the national economy came more expansive theories of personal jurisdiction, namely, the stream-ofcommerce doctrine.12
The stream-of-commerce doctrine is not a distinctive theory of personal jurisdiction, but provides
a methodology for satisfying the purposeful availment
requirement of specific jurisdiction. Plaintiffs rely on
4
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this jurisdictional doctrine when the defendant’s only
contacts with the forum state are that its products
were placed into the stream of commerce and were
ultimately sold in the state. The question, therefore,
is whether a defendant purposefully avails itself
of a forum state by “deliver[ing] its products into
the stream of commerce with the expectation that
they will be purchased by consumers in the forum
state.”13
The Supreme Court last addressed the stream-ofcommerce issue almost twenty-five years ago in Asahi
Metal Industry v. Superior Court.14 Unfortunately,
the parameters of the stream-of-commerce doctrine
were not well defined in Asahi; thus, there has been
great confusion in this area for a long time now. In
Asahi, a majority of the justices could not agree as
to the requirements for personal jurisdiction under a
stream-of-commerce theory. One opinion, authored
by Justice O’Connor, found that “[t]he placement of a
product into the stream-of-commerce, without more,
is not an act of the defendant purposefully directed
toward the forum State,” and that the requisite
something “more” might be marketing, advertising,
service, or design done with the forum in mind.15
Justice Brennan opined, by contrast, that placing a
product in the stream of commerce with an awareness “that the final product is being marketed in the
forum State” is all that is necessary for purposeful
availment.16
In the wake of Asahi, many appellate courts
adopted either Justice O’Connor’s or Justice Brennan’s
approach to stream-of-commerce jurisdiction.17 Other
courts disregarded Asahi since there was not a majority opinion and instead have followed earlier personal
jurisdiction cases like World Wide Volkswagen Corp.
v. Woodson.18 The result is an extremely complicated
jurisprudential landscape, which the Internet has
made even more difficult to navigate.
INTERNET-RELATED CONTACTS
AND PERSONAL JURISDICTION
The Internet has had a profound impact on the
way we communicate, conduct business, and engage
in commercial transactions. The volume of transstate
and transnational contacts has increased dramatically and so questions of personal jurisdiction have
moved to the forefront in the Internet age. While
some courts have continued to apply the traditional
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minimum contacts test to Internet-based jurisdiction,
others have taken a different tack. Zippo Manufacturing
v. Zippo DOT Com,19 for example, established a sliding
scale of Internet activity test that has gained popularity with many other courts.
The Zippo case arose in the context of a trademark dispute, but it has had far-reaching implications.
The question in Zippo was whether the defendant—a
California corporation whose principal business was
an Internet news service that allowed online users to
access newsgroups through its Web site—was subject
to specific personal jurisdiction in Pennsylvania.
The primary issue was whether the defendant had
purposefully availed itself of Pennsylvania by engaging in electronic commerce with residents of that
forum. To answer this question, the court introduced
a sliding-scale test that characterizes virtual contacts
as falling into three categories.20 At one end of the
scale are “active” Web sites used to conduct business
transactions. At the opposite end of the spectrum
are “passive” Web sites where a defendant simply
makes information available on a Web site that may
be accessed by residents of other states. And in the
middle of the sliding scale are “interactive” Web sites,
which allow for the exchange of information between
the Web site’s host and non-residents, but where business transactions do not necessarily occur. Under this
sliding scale test, the maintenance of an active Web
site amounts to purposeful availment, while the maintenance of a passive Web site does not. Interactive
Web sites may or may not subject the defendant to
personal jurisdiction depending on the specific nature
of the site.21
In theory, the use of a bright-line test like the
one announced in Zippo is beneficial. It should
increase predictability for litigants and ease the burden on the courts in deciding difficult jurisdictional
questions. But this “one-size-fits-all” approach contradicts the Supreme Court’s mandate that personal
jurisdiction be decided on a case-by-case basis.22
Moreover, many courts have reflexively followed
the Zippo test without regard to either the basic
tenets of the personal jurisdiction doctrine or the
particular factual circumstances of the case. For
example, some courts have subjected defendants to
general jurisdiction under the Zippo sliding-scale
test even though Zippo applies only to the specific
jurisdiction analysis.23 Other courts applying Zippo
have diverged over the definition of interactivity
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or have tweaked Zippo to require a target audience
in the forum or a history of actual interaction with
forum residents.24
Thus, the supposedly simple-to-apply Zippo test
has, in actuality, contributed to the creation of a
body-of-case law on Internet-related personal jurisdiction that is confusing, inconsistent, and sometimes
even inaccurate. When the Supreme Court granted
certiorari in Goodyear and McIntyre last term, many
hoped these unsettled questions regarding personal
jurisdiction would finally be resolved.
T H E G O O DY E A R A N D
MCINTYRE CASES
The Goodyear and McIntyre cases share many
commonalities: they involved product liability claims;
the defendants were foreign entities; and the Supreme
Court ultimately determined that personal jurisdiction was lacking in both cases. Yet there are also
distinctions between Goodyear and McIntyre. Most
significantly, Goodyear was a general jurisdiction case,
while the plaintiff in McIntyre was relying on a theory
of specific jurisdiction.
Goodyear Dunlap Tires v. Brown
The dispute in Goodyear revolved around a bus
accident in Paris, France, that killed two thirteenyear-old boys from North Carolina who were traveling with their soccer team.25 Alleging that faulty tires
caused the accident, the boys’ families sued Goodyear
USA and its Turkish subsidiary (“Goodyear Turkey”),
the manufacturer of the tires involved in the accident,
in state court in North Carolina. The state court held
that Goodyear Turkey was subject to general jurisdiction in North Carolina because it had continuously
and systematically placed products into the stream of
commerce destined for North Carolina. Specifically,
the court cited Goodyear Turkey’s significant volume
of tire sales in the state between 2004 and 2007 as the
basis for subjecting the defendant to general jurisdiction in North Carolina.26
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari to
answer the following question: “Are foreign subsidiaries of a United States parent corporation amenable to
suit in state court on claims unrelated to any activity of the subsidiaries in the forum state?”27 Before
answering that question, however, the Court made
clear that there was no basis for exercising specific
5
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jurisdiction in this case because the defendant’s
contacts with North Carolina—the sale of tires in
that state—did not relate to the plaintiff’s claim.
The Court explained that the accident did not occur
in North Carolina, the tires were not manufactured
there, and none of the tires involved in the accident
had been sold in North Carolina. Thus, there was no
nexus between the plaintiff’s claim and the defendant’s contacts with the forum as required by specific
jurisdiction principles.28
Turning then to general jurisdiction, the Court
first indicated that the North Carolina courts’ reliance on stream of commerce was misplaced since this
was a general jurisdiction case and that the theory
applies only in the specific jurisdiction context.29
With that clarification, the Court held that general
jurisdiction over a non-resident defendant is appropriate when the defendant’s contacts with the state
are so continuous and systematic as to render the
defendant essentially “at home” in the forum State.30
While declining to explicate this “at home” standard,
the Court applied it to the case at bar, determined
that Goodyear Turkey was not subject to personal
jurisdiction in North Carolina, and reversed the decision of the lower court.31
J. McIntyre v. Nicastro
Unlike Goodyear, the McIntyre case raised
questions about the specific jurisdiction doctrine.32 In McIntyre, the plaintiff Robert Nicastro
seriously injured his hand while using a metalshearing machine manufactured by the defendant
J. McIntyre Machinery (“J. McIntyre”). Although
the accident occurred in New Jersey, the machine
was manufactured in England where J. McIntyre
is incorporated and operates. Nicastro’s employer,
Curcio Scrap Metal (“Curcio”), did not purchase
the machine directly from J. McIntyre. Instead,
J. McIntyre sold its machines to a US distributor in
Ohio who then sold one of the machines to Curcio
in New Jersey.33
Nicastro sued J. McIntyre in New Jersey state
court alleging that the machine was defective, and J.
McIntyre challenged personal jurisdiction. The case
made its way to the New Jersey Supreme Court, which
adopted Justice Brennan’s position from Asahi and
held that J. McIntyre had subjected itself to personal
jurisdiction in New Jersey. Invoking the stream-ofcommerce theory, the court held that a defendant like
6

Januar y

2012

J. McIntyre purposefully avails itself of a foreign state
so long as it “knew or reasonably should have known
that its products are distributed through a nationwide
distribution system that might lead to those products
being sold in any of the fifty states.”34
The US Supreme Court granted certiorari and
reversed. Although six justices agreed that J. McIntyre
was not subject to personal jurisdiction in New
Jersey, the Court failed to muster a majority on any
particular rationale. Writing for the plurality, Justice
Kennedy first stated that, in products liability cases
like this one, personal jurisdiction depends on the
defendant’s purposeful availment.35 The plurality then
acknowledged that a defendant may purposefully avail
itself by sending goods, rather than agents, into a
forum state.36 However, the plurality explained, “[t]he
defendant’s transmission of goods permits the exercise
of jurisdiction only where the defendant can be said
to have targeted the forum; as a general rule, it is not
enough that the defendant might have predicted that
its goods will reach the forum State.”37 In other words,
the plurality in McIntyre appears to have adopted
Justice O’Connor’s stream-of-commerce “plus” test for
purposeful availment.
The plurality did not stop there, however. A
significant portion of the opinion is spent attempting to explain why the Constitution limits states like
New Jersey from exercising personal jurisdiction over
defendants like J. McIntyre. While conceding that
the personal jurisdiction doctrine is grounded in the
Due Process Clause, the plurality argued that notions
of state sovereignty also limit the exercise of personal
jurisdiction over non-residents.38
Despite this in-depth discussion of state sovereignty, the plurality ultimately decided the case based
on its evaluation of the purposeful availment prong
of the specific jurisdiction test. In the plurality’s view,
J. McIntyre did not purposefully avail itself of New
Jersey because the defendant only intended to serve
the US market as a whole, not New Jersey in particular; the defendant’s officers attended trade shows in
several states, but not New Jersey; and only four of
the machines involved in the accident ended up in
New Jersey.39 Under these circumstances, the plurality held that the exercise of jurisdiction would offend
due process.40
In addition to the plurality, there were also
concurring and dissenting opinions in McIntyre.
Like the plurality, the concurrence of Justices Breyer
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and Alito held that J. McIntyre was not subject to
personal jurisdiction in New Jersey; for a number of
reasons, however, the concurrence declined to join
the plurality’s opinion. First and foremost, the concurrence did not believe this was an appropriate case
in which to fashion new jurisdictional rules based on
our evolving global economy.41 While acknowledging
that commerce and communication has undergone
significant transformation in recent years, the concurrence emphasized that the machine at issue in
McIntyre ended up in New Jersey through traditional
commercial channels. Nicastro did not claim that
J. McIntyre was subject to jurisdiction in New Jersey
based on its “virtual” contacts with the state. Unlike
in many modern cases, there were no allegations that
the defendant maintained a Web site or engaged in
e-commerce. Accordingly, Justice Breyer believed it
unwise to rework the personal jurisdiction doctrine
“without a better understanding of the relevant contemporary commercial circumstances.”42
With this concern in mind, the concurrence held
that the jurisdictional question in McIntyre could be
resolved by looking to the facts and adhering strictly
to prior precedent, thereby avoiding any broad pronouncements regarding personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. Unlike the plurality, Justices Breyer and
Alito did not choose sides in the stream-of-commerce
debate because they believed that defendant had not
purposefully availed itself of New Jersey under either
test.43 Focusing exclusively on the facts presented to
the lower court and refusing to consider anything
outside the record, the concurrence concluded that
J. McIntyre was not subject to personal jurisdiction
in New Jersey.44
In contradistinction to the plurality and concurrence, the dissent—which was authored by Justice
Ginsburg and joined by Justices Sotomayor and
Kagan—held that New Jersey’s exercise of personal
jurisdiction over J. McIntyre was constitutional.45
In reaching this decision, the dissent highlighted
J. McIntyre’s connection with New Jersey, especially
the fact that the machine was in New Jersey and that
is where Nicastro was injured. The dissent distinguished Asahi on the grounds that the defendant in
that case was only a component-part manufacturer
and did not itself seek out customers in the United
States, unlike J. McIntyre.46 The dissent also rejected
the plurality’s rationale, concluding “the constitutional limits on a state court’s adjudicatory authority
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derive from considerations of due process, not state
sovereignty.”47 Finally, after noting that fairness is
the touchstone of personal jurisdiction, the dissent
held that there is nothing unfair about subjecting a
corporate defendant like J. McIntyre to jurisdiction
in New Jersey—the forum where its product was sold
and caused the plaintiff’s injury.
T H E F U T U R E O F I N T E R N E TR E L AT E D P E R S O N A L
JURISDICTION
When the US Supreme Court granted certiorari
in Goodyear and McIntyre, many believed that the
decisions would provide greater guidance on the doctrines of general and specific jurisdiction, particularly
in the Internet context. Unfortunately, Goodyear and
McIntyre failed to resolve certain outstanding questions related to personal jurisdiction, such as the split
in Asahi between Justices O’Connor and Brennan.
Moreover, Goodyear and McIntyre raise a whole
host of new issues about the future of the personal
jurisdiction doctrine. Yet, until the Court speaks on
these issues again, litigants and lower courts are left
to extrapolate the lessons to be learned from these
two cases.
Of the two cases, Goodyear’s impact on Internetrelated personal jurisdiction is easier to predict.
Before Goodyear, some courts held that a defendant’s
virtual contacts with a forum state were sufficient
under the Zippo sliding scale test to support general
jurisdiction. Gator.com Corp. v. L.L. Bean, Inc., is a
good example.48 In that case, the Ninth Circuit held
that the defendant L.L. Bean was subject to general
jurisdiction in California because it conducted business over the Internet, and its Internet business contacts with California were substantial, continuous,
and systematic. The court reasoned that “an online
store can operate as the functional equivalent of a
physical store,” and the nature of L.L. Bean’s commercial activity in California was substantial enough
that it “approximated physical presence” sufficient for
general jurisdiction.49
Similarly, in Gorman v. Ameritrade Holding
Corp.,50 the US Court of Appeals for the District
of Columbia Circuit held a non-resident defendant
subject to general jurisdiction based on its virtual
contacts with the District. In the court’s opinion,
defendant Ameritrade Holding Corp., an online
7
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brokerage firm, had subjected itself to jurisdiction by
maintaining a Web site through which it conducted
business in the District. Specifically, customers in
the District could use the Web site to open accounts,
transmit funds to those accounts electronically, use
the accounts to buy and sell securities, and enter
into binding contracts with the defendant. In turn,
defendant would transmit electronic confirmations,
account statements, and other financial information back to its customers in the District.51 If these
contacts between Ameritrade and its customers were
substantial, continuous, and systematic, general jurisdiction would lie in the District.52
The decision in Goodyear casts doubt on the
holding and rationale of L.L. Bean, Ameritrade, and
similar cases basing general jurisdiction on continuous and systematic virtual contacts with the forum
state.53 The Goodyear Court attempted to provide
additional guidance for gauging general jurisdiction
and explained that the defendant not only must have
continuous and systematic contacts with the forum
state, but must be “at home” there too.54 Although
the Court did not define this “at home” standard,
it held unanimously that Goodyear Turkey’s continuous and systematic sale of its products into North
Carolina fell short. Thus, the looming question after
Goodyear is whether any sort of “doing business”
jurisdiction survives, or whether corporate defendants
will only be subject to general jurisdiction where they
are actually at home, meaning where they are incorporated and headquartered. Either way, it is plain
that Goodyear narrowed the breadth of the general
jurisdiction doctrine.
It is harder to foresee how McIntyre might affect
personal jurisdiction jurisprudence. As is already
becoming evident, courts will respond differently to
this decision. Some courts will continue to rely on
earlier cases in resolving personal jurisdiction disputes
since there was no majority opinion in McIntyre.55
Others will follow Marks v. United States, which held
that “[w]hen a fragmented Court decides a case and
no single rationale explaining the result enjoys the
assent of five Justices, the holding of the Court may
be viewed as the position taken by those Members
who concurred in the judgments on the narrowest
grounds….”56 Applying this test, one court recently
decided that McIntyre stands for the proposition that
“specific jurisdiction must arise from a defendant’s
deliberate connection with the forum state,” rather
8
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than with the United States as a whole.57 Finally,
there will be courts that mistakenly treat the plurality
decision in McIntyre as a majority opinion, the result
of which will be a much stricter interpretation of the
specific jurisdiction doctrine.58
While it is difficult to predict how lower courts
will interpret and apply McIntyre, there is a good
chance that the Supreme Court will provide additional guidance on personal jurisdiction sometime
soon. Three of the nine members of the Court—
Justices Ginsburg, Sotomayor, and Kagan—dissented
and likely would welcome the opportunity to reconsider the jurisdictional issues left unresolved by
McIntyre. Perhaps more significantly, the concurrence
stated explicitly that McIntyre was not the proper
case for retooling the personal jurisdiction doctrine:
“Because the incident at issue in this case does not
implicate modern concerns and because the factual
record leaves many open questions, this is an unsuitable vehicle for making broad pronouncements that
refashion basic jurisdictional rules.”59 This strongly
suggests that Justices Breyer and Alito are open to
hearing another personal jurisdiction case—most
likely one involving Internet-related contacts—in
the near future.
CONCLUSION
Personal jurisdiction questions, particularly those
concerning Internet-related contacts, arise often in
civil lawsuits. Despite the frequency with which
these issues arise, however, the personal jurisdiction
doctrine has been plagued by complexity and confusion for many years. The Supreme Court’s decision
last term to review Goodyear and McIntyre provided
hope for a resolution to some of these outstanding
problems surrounding the personal jurisdiction analysis. Unfortunately, though, the opinions issued by
the Court—especially in McIntyre—fall far short of
the clear-cut guidance that lower courts and litigants
seek.
If there is a silver lining in these decisions it is
that Goodyear clearly distinguishes between general
and specific jurisdiction and affords some guidance
as to the scope of general jurisdiction with its new
“at home” standard. As for McIntyre, the highly
splintered opinion is so muddled and fact specific,
that its application to other cases should be limited.
Finally, and most importantly, several members of the
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Supreme Court appear to recognize that in today’s
fast-paced and increasingly borderless global economy, traditional constructs of personal jurisdiction
may no longer be viable. Thus, it is unlikely that the
Supreme Court will wait another quarter of a century
to revisit these pressing jurisdiction issues.
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